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Abstract: Managing multiple and conflicting goals is a demand typical to both everyday life and complex coordination 
tasks. Two experiments (N = 111) investigated how goal conflicts affect motivation and cognition in a complex problem-
solving paradigm. In Experiment 1, participants dealt with a game-like computer simulation involving a predefined goal 
relation: Parallel goals were independent, mutually facilitating, or interfering with one another. As expected, goal conflicts 
entailed lowered motivation and wellbeing. Participants’ understanding of causal effects within the simulation was im-
paired, too. Behavioral measures of subjects’ interventions support the idea of adaptive, self-regulatory processes: reduced 
action with growing awareness of the goal conflict and balanced goal pursuit. Experiment 2 endorses the hypotheses of 
motivation loss and reduced acquisition of system-related knowledge in an extended problem-solving paradigm of four 
conflicting goals. Impairing effects of goal interference on motivation and wellbeing were found, although less distinct 
and robust as in Experiment 1. Participants undertook fewer interventions in case of a goal conflict and acquired less 
knowledge about the system. Formal complexity due to the interconnectedness among goals is discussed as a limiting  
influence on inferring the problem structure.  
Keywords: complex problem solving, goal conflicts, motivation, system knowledge, strategy.  
INTRODUCTION 
 You cannot have your cake and eat it, too. One of the 
possibly best-known goal conflicts is delivered by a proverb. 
Similar common sayings across other languages exist, mark-
ing conflicting strivings an intercultural or even universal 
phenomenon. Examples from everyday life are abundant: 
working overtime in order to qualify for a better job vs. 
spending leisure time with friends or family, affording either 
an expensive holiday trip or a redecorated apartment, enroll-
ing to a fitness class vs. watching TV in the evening, just to 
name a few. From an interpersonal point of view, goal con-
flicts can be found within the structure of enterprises and 
organizations. Managers in business and industry, e.g., ought 
to keep a balance between financial gains, customers' de-
mands, efficient work processes and both sustaining and 
developing employees' human resources [1]. Multiple goals 
may arise from the demands of multiple lobbies. They can 
entail both interpersonal goal conflicts between the lobbies’ 
members as well as intrapersonal goal conflicts within an 
ambivalent manager’s mind.  
 Yet, to pursue multiple and conflicting goals is more than 
a mere decision on priority, subordinate and dispensable 
goals. The manager in our example additionally needs to 
figure out how each of the goals can be achieved. Experience 
through exploration, analytical and practical skills are neces-
sary to overcome barriers that make the desired state differ  
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from the situation at hand – a prototypical instance of com-
plex problem solving [2]. 
 In the present paper, we investigate how cognitive repre-
sentations and strategies in problem solving are affected by 
goal conflicts. Emphasis is put on the interaction between 
cognition, motivation, and the experience of distress. A 
complex dynamic control (CDC) task approach is reported 
and applied in two subsequent experiments.  
MULTIPLE GOALS IN COMPLEX PROBLEM  
SOLVING 
 Speaking in terms of a general definition, complex prob-
lems represent multifaceted, dynamic situations that involve 
a large number of interconnected elements. The exact, under-
lying relationships between a problem's components are un-
known to the person struggling with the problem. Besides 
this, the complex problem can be denoted as polytelic (i.e., 
implying multiple goals): Problem-solvers are confronted 
with a number of different goal facets to be weighted and 
coordinated [2]. 
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG MULTIPLE GOALS 
 As any given complex problem constitutes a system of 
connected elements, goals within the problem structure usu-
ally do not stand apart, but are linked according to one of 
three relational types: goal independence, goal compatibility, 
or goal interference [3]. For dyads of two goals each, the 
relational types can be defined as follows: In case of goal 
independence, in spite of interrelated elements in a problem 
space goals can be pursued and achieved separately from one 
another. Goal A has no effect, neither positive nor negative, 
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on goal B and vice versa. Goal compatibility, sometimes 
termed goal facilitation or goal synergy, refers to contexts in 
which achieving goal A increases the probability of achiev-
ing goal B at the same time. Goal interference – finally and 
most interestingly in our study – occurs if two goals cannot 
be achieved simultaneously without considerable extra effort 
or cannot be achieved simultaneously at all. Successful ac-
tions towards goal A will decrease the probability of reach-
ing goal B as well. Goal interference should occur if both 
goals require equivalent, but limited resources (e.g., time, 
cognitive capacities) and compete for them as found in mul-
titasking paradigms [4]. Besides such indirect goal conflicts 
based on parallel demands, goals can be opposed when their 
consequences are mutually exclusive. In an extreme specifi-
cation, goal A would be the precise negative mirror image of 
goal B (not-A), making combined success logically impossi-
ble. We will refer to these conflict situations as goal antago-
nism and provide examples in the method section below.  
CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH 
 In how far has empirical research taken into account the 
effects of multiple and conflicting goals? At first glance, 
research on goal conflicts appears to be abundant. Beginning 
with the work of Kurt Lewin [5] it has been widely recog-
nized that goal conflicts are difficult to deal with. Many is-
sues stemming from Lewin’s tradition are settled in the pri-
mary field of motivational psychology with particular respect 
to long-term personal strivings and wellbeing [6, 7]. Em-
mons and colleagues [8, 9] report increased levels of con-
flict-related stress and reduced wellbeing, although under 
certain conditions stabilizing effects of multiple goals on 
wellbeing have been observed [10]. Studies from the field of 
action psychology and multitasking paradigms [4] explain 
reduced performance by limitations of human cognitive ca-
pacity. 
 Issues focusing on goal conflicts in complex problem 
solving, however, are comparably scarce. Firstly, a straight- 
forward and well-supported general prediction is that the 
more goals are to be handled simultaneously the worse goal 
achievement will be. With respect to complex problem  
solving, an experiment by Funke [11] is in line with this 
view. Participants dealing with four parallel goals in a  
CDC simulation performed worse on goal achievement and 
acquisition of goal-related knowledge than control subjects 
dealing with only two goals in the same complex system. 
The effect was observed although no explicit goal antago-
nism was inherent to the problem structure. 
 Secondly, besides the mere number of goals their quality 
has required consideration. A CDC problem-solving experi-
ment by Vollmeyer and Burns [12] provided evidence  
that participants instructed to merely explore a CDC system 
(unspecific goal) gained more system-related knowledge 
than participants instructed to reach specific goal values. As 
Vollmeyer and Burns [12, 13] argue, single, specific goals 
can promote the acquisition of isolated solution paths, but in 
order to gain broad, comprehensive knowledge goal specific-
ity will be less helpful.  
AIM OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
 In the discussion of problem solving under polytelic con-
ditions, thus far, some authors have been implicitly assuming 
underlying goal conflicts [2], but lacked a closer look at how 
problem solvers actually perceive goal relations. The study 
at hand aims at a clear separation between multiple goals on 
the one hand and conflicting goals on the other hand. Using 
the taxonomy presented above, we will investigate effects of 
explicit goal antagonism in a formal complex problem-
solving paradigm. Additionally, we will reconsider the im-
pact of capacity limitations by varying the number of con-
flicting goals in a second study. 
HOW GOAL CONFLICTS MIGHT AFFECT COM-
PLEX PROBLEM SOLVING: A FRAMEWORK 
 The main concern of our study is to combine the above 
named perspectives from motivational psychology and the 
perspective of complex problem solving. An initial move 
towards a cognitive-motivational framework of problem 
solving under polytelic situations is developed. Our pioneer 
framework includes five hypotheses to be tested (see Fig. 1).  
 Hypothesis 1: In complex problem situations involving 
antagonistic goal relations, problem solvers report losses of 
current motivation. 
 We expect measures of current motivation to decrease in 
problem-solving situations of antagonistic structure since 
antagonism implies at least partial non-attainment of goals. 
Given that two goal states cannot be achieved at the same 
time, subjects should be prompted to settle for moderate suc-
cess concerning both goals or they might accept failure for 
one goal combined with success for the complementary goal. 
Whereas in real life further strategies might be conceived 
(e.g., striving for one goal first and for the other goal next, 
trying to find common aspects to link both goals on a con-
ceptual level), according to our understanding of goal an-
tagonism, goal redefinitions are limited. Disappointment is 
therefore pre-assigned in either case, independent of individ-
ual goal management. 
 The feasible assumption that goal failure induces low 
motivation finds empirical support for both long-term striv-
ings and relatively straightforward achievement tasks in ex-
perimental settings (e.g., [14-16]). Mediated by pre-installed 
(partial) failure, participants should suffer from losses in 
current motivation. 
 Hypothesis 2: In complex problem situations involving 
antagonistic goal relations, problem solvers report increases 
in experienced stress symptoms. 
 Similar to hypothesis 1, we assume that in addition to 
supposed motivational effects subjective wellbeing including 
physiological symptoms, too, will be impaired for situations 
of conflicting goals. We predict increased rumination  
about non-attainment, depressive mood, and perceived stress 
[17].  
 Hypothesis 3: In complex problem situations involving 
antagonistic goal relations, problem solvers adopt a deliber-
ate, state-orientation-like approach towards the problem. 
 Rumination associated with depressive mood can be con-
sidered as a specific cognitive style. When struggling with 
non-attainable and non-attained goal standards, frustrated 
problem-solvers should be less prone to undertake immedi-
ate measurements of exploration or goal-directed problem 
solving. By the conflicting goal structure, action is more or 
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less obstructed. Instead, problem-solvers are likely to spend 
more time thinking about possible reasons for failure and 
trying to figure out alternative measures. 
 Hypothesis 4: In complex problem situations involving 
antagonistic goal relations, problem solvers adopt increased 
systematics of manipulation strategies.  
 The question arising from previous hypotheses is whether 
presumed rumination, state-orientation and negative affect 
will be attended by low efficiency in problem solving. We 
suggest that this is not the case. Research on interactions 
between mood and cognition provides theoretical reasoning 
and empirical support that in a negative mood people tend to 
perform worse on heuristic, creative tasks, but better on tasks 
demanding accuracy and analytical reasoning [18]. Although 
problem solving implies creativity, analytical thinking, too, 
is necessary to exploration and comprehensive understanding 
of the problem-structure. In most analytical problems the 
quality of a solution will benefit from thorough reflection 
and from a scarce number of subjects’ interventions [13, 19-
23]. The less interventions are undertaken, the more knowl-
edge will be gained, i.e., the better a complex system will be 
decoded in terms of its various, interconnected effects, be-
cause problem-solvers have the chance to observe and infer 
effects separately, one after the other. Accordingly, states of 
limited action-orientation appear to entail useful, systematic, 
and purposeful strategies of dealing with a complex system, 
and these strategies are expected to accumulate under goal 
conflict conditions.  
 Hypothesis 5: In complex problem situations involving 
antagonistic goal relations, problem solvers acquire an in-
creased amount of system-related knowledge. 
 Systematics of exploratory strategies predicts how well a 
person will figure out the problem structure [12, 21]. This 
positive relationship makes us assume increased knowledge 
acquisition when goal conflicts occur than when goals are 
compatible, the relational complexity of the system being 
kept constant. 
A CDC TASK APPROACH TO INDUCE GOAL  
CONFLICTS 
 As outlined in the section of goal relations, goal conflicts 
can arise from multiple origins. Multitasking-like scenarios 
usually imply goal conflicts because time constraints or limi-
tations in cognitive capacity force a person to abandon goals 
or subgoals [4]. However, they do not guarantee conflicts, 
and the degree of conflict may vary with an individual's skill, 
ability, and experience. To lessen the impact of interpersonal 
differences and to ensure that conflicts will definitely occur 
we decided in favor of a direct conflict manipulation imple-
mented in a computer program. The basic notion is to design 
a goal relation so that the closer a person gets to reach one 
goal, the more he or she will drift away from another, con-
flicting goal.  
Semantic Context of the CDC Task 
 We aimed to create a quasi-realistic simulation environ-
ment that incorporates an antagonistic goal structure in a 
motivating semantic goal context. According to the cover 
story we chose, our simulation tool, the “Hanssen Shipping 
Company”, provides a simplified version of a virtual busi-
ness environment. Participants are assigned the part of the 
ship owner and leading entrepreneur. In doing so they simul-
taneously strive for each of the four goals: (a) contentment of 
passengers, (b) productivity of employees, (c) quality of 
management, and (d) public reputation of ship owner. Theo-
retical foundation of this goal structure is derived from the 
management concept of the Balanced Score Card [1]. 
 A semantic pretest was conducted to figure out whether 
on the base of their general “world knowledge” people 
would expect conflict relations between any of these goals. 
An online questionnaire was completed by a mixed sample 
of students and shipping experts (N = 45). On average, par-
ticipants rated the goal relations neutral, i.e., neither conflict-
ing nor synergistic. We therefore concluded that from their 
pre-experimental knowledge subjects should find it about 
equally likely to discover either conflict, independence or 
synergy between dyads of the scenario goals.  
 Each of the four goals are associated with nine corre-
sponding measures, which, when activated, directly affect a 
goal (for examples see Fig. 2 below). In order to improve the 
contentment of passengers, participants can, e.g., extend the 
animation aboard, enlarge the service team in a traveling 
agency, or reduce traveling fares; in order to improve the 
productivity of employees, participants can try to reduce the 
amount of routine demands, introduce flexible working 
hours, or renovate the staff canteen, among others. These 
measures, too, were pre-rated in the online questionnaire 
according to two criteria: (a) for which category the measure 
was most typical and (b) how effective each measure was 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (1). A cognitive!motivational model of goal conflicts’ effects on complex problem solving. 
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considered with respect to promoting the corresponding  
goal. Averaged effectiveness ratings provided the basis of 
effectiveness parameters implemented in the computer  
program.  
Structure of the CDC Task  
 The variables from our list that can be manipulated by 
the participant are called the input or exogenous variables. 
The two-goal version of our scenario (Experiment 1) in-
volves 18 such variables, the extended four-goal scenario 
(Experiment 2) involves 36 exogenous variables. Endoge-
nous variables are the two goal variables contentment of 
passengers and productivity of employees in Experiment 1 
and the four goal variables contentment of passengers (CP), 
productivity of employees (PE), quality of management, and 
public reputation of ship owner in Experiment 2. For illustra-
tion, we describe the conflict manipulation between two 
goals in detail. For a description of the four-goal version see 
the method section of Experiment 2.  
 Being a dynamic problem, the CDC task consists of a 
sequence of intervention steps. Problem solvers choose 
measures from the lists, i.e., they make interventions, which 
in turn are followed by a feedback of the system and then by 
the participant’s next intervention. The system provides 
feedback as numerical scores of the endogenous variables, 
starting with the default value of 100 at the outset. The 
higher the score, the more successful the goal attainment. 
 Exogenous variables affect the endogenous scores as 
follows: Each input variable has been assigned a defined, 
numerical weight, i.e., its effectiveness. A highly effective 
measure such as "increase payment of wages" would yield a 
weight of 4 points, a moderately effective measure such as 
"renovate staff canteen" would yield a weight of 2 points, 
and a non-effective measure such as "apply recruitment 
tests" would yield a weight of 0 points. Among the nine ex-
ogenous variables associated with a goal, there are three 
variables from each category. For all exogenous variables 
chosen during an intervention step, the corresponding weight 
scores will be summed up. In order to prevent that subjects 
simply pick all exogenous variables, cost scores will be sub-
tracted. Costs are implemented so that selecting the full 
range of interventions will neither yield an increase nor a 
decrease in the goal scores. Instead, to raise goal scores, par-
ticipants are challenged to experiment and search for effec-
tive single or combined measures from the intervention list. 
Also, if a particular – and particularly effective – combina-
tion of inputs is selected, a predefined bonus score will be 
added. Picking the three highly effective measures "increase 
payment of wages", "send machine operators on advanced 
training courses", and "award bonuses for special achieve-
ments" on the side of PE and none but these, e.g., will be 
rewarded by 12 extra scores.  
 Weight scores, bonuses and costs will be totaled to form 
an intervention score which directly relates to an endogenous 
variable. If the current score of CP has been 100 and 12 
points have been gained due to manipulations listed under 
CP, the next step’s score of CP will be 100 + 12 = 112. Simi-
larly, if the current state of PE has been 100 and 4 points 
have been gained due to manipulations listed under PE, the 
next step’s score of PE will be 100 + 4 = 100. So far, this 
example illustrates an independent goal relation. To turn it 
into a conflict relation, points gained on the part of CP will 
be subtracted from the total score of PE and vice versa, e.g., 
as to CP 100 + 12 – 4 = 108 and as to PE 100 + 4 – 12 = 92. 
This implies that for antagonistic goals in the approach at 
hand, in fact, the sum score of both goals will maintain a 
constant level. Gains regarding the goal CP can only be real-
ized at the expense of equally large losses concerning the 
goal PE.  
 Besides this manipulation of an immanent goal conflict 
(goal antagonism), for the purpose of between-subjects com-
parisons in the experimental design we established a version 
of the above explained goal independence and a goal 
synergy version. Goal synergy implies the same degree of 
formal complexity as goal antagonisms, but instead of sub-
tracting, points gained on either side are added to both goals. 
Following the example this would lead to a score of 100 +12 
+ 4 = 116 for CP and an equal score of 100 + 4 + 12 = 112 
for PE.  
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
 Participants. 69 participants (15 male, 54 female) were 
recruited at the Department of Psychology at the University 
of Heidelberg, Germany. Most subjects were undergraduate 
students in psychology, ranging in age from 18 to 45 (M = 
22.35, SD = 5.14). To compensate for participation, students 
were given course credit. For two participants, electronic 
recording of problem-solving activities partly failed. To en-
sure balanced three-level ANOVA analyses, from a random 
observation of the third experimental condition we removed 
corresponding data, leading to sixty-six complete data re-
cords (22 per goal condition). Gender ratios were equal for 
the three experimental conditions.  
 Design. Goal relation was manipulated between subjects 
on three levels: goal antagonism, goal independence, and 
goal synergy. Participants worked on the goal scenario for 
two identical and subsequent rounds; “time” was hence in-
troduced as a two-level within-subject-factor in a 2 ! 3 
ANOVA design.  
 Procedure. After a brief outline of the experimental pro-
cedure, by signature subjects gave their informed written 
consent to participate. They were reminded that taking part 
was voluntary and that they might abandon the experiment if 
they wished to. Instruction phase furthermore comprised a 
questionnaire on self-regulatory habits (HAKEMP), an in-
troduction on how to handle the computer simulation, and 
self-report questionnaires on pre-experimental stress and 
current motivation. Subjects passed through two phases of 
complex problem solving, each consisting of a ten-step-
interaction with the CDC task and afterwards questionnaires 
on system-related knowledge, self-reported strategic ap-
proaches, stress, and current motivation. Goal relation was 
randomized between subjects, i.e., one third of the sample 
worked on an antagonistic goal scenario, one third on an 
independent goal scenario, another third on a synergistic 
goal scenario. The goal relation assigned to a participant 
remained the same throughout the two phases. Final meas-
ures on socio-demographical variables and school achieve-
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ment were retrieved from questionnaires after Phase 3.  
Subjects were debriefed concerning the purpose of the study 
and received course credit and chocolate in return for their 
services. 
 Materials and measures. The “Hanssen Shipping Com-
pany” simulation was created with the aid of the program-
ming tool AgentSheets, version 1.6 X [24]. Subject data 
were written automatically into MS excel files while running 
the system. A screenshot of the two-goal-scenario is pro-
vided by Fig. (2). Labels are translated into English. The 
original version employed in our experiment contained Ger-
man labels. All information necessary to work on the prob-
lem is compiled in one window. The upper part displays 
achievement status for both goal demands by score numbers, 
horizontal bars represent the score graphically, and arrows 
indicate either an upward, downward, or a constant devel-
opment of goal scores. From the lists below, users point and 
click boxes to select or deselect relevant measurements by 
visible check marks. Once they have finished they submit 
their inputs by operating the “finished” button, then switch-
ing to a new simulation month, i.e., a new intervention step. 
Check marks from the previous month are then removed. 
Participants run through a sequence of ten such in-ter-de-
pen-dent steps. From the instruction participants were en-
couraged to start their exploration on the base of pre-existing 
knowledge and plausibility. Yet they were clearly pointed to 
the fact that semantic relations in the scenario might dissent 
from their individual expectancies and that it might be indi-
cated to modify one’s problem-solving behavior accordingly.  
 To assess task-related current motivation we employed 
the German version of the questionnaire of current motiva-
tion (QCM) developed by Rheinberg, Vollmeyer, and Burns 
[25]. The QCM form contains 18 statements to appraise on a 
7-point Likert scale. Sample items from the QCM are, e.g., 
"I would work on this task even in my free time" (interest), 
"I think I am up to the difficulty of the task" (probability  
of success), or "I feel under pressure to do this task well" 
(anxiety).  
 Experienced stress symptoms were retrieved by 12 items 
of a self-report 7-point Likert scale that was constructed 
from dimensions of perceived stress symptoms according  
to Kohli [26], e.g., strain, resignation, impatience, anger, 
restlessness. 
 Another 10-item self-report questionnaire (5-point Likert 
scale) asked about styles of subjects’ intervening manipula-
tions. Construction of this measure followed a scale of habit-
ual decision-making styles by Scott and Bruce [27]. Ratings 
concerning perceived rationality ("I reflected each step care-
fully"), avoiding decisions ("Often I hesitated because I 
could not make a decision"), intuition ("Often I decided by 
intuition"), dependency from others ("I would have liked to 
ask somebody for advice"), and spontaneousness ("Most of 
the time I decided spontaneously") were combined to de-
scribe cognitive approaches towards the problem. For the 
same purpose we recorded and analyzed solution times.  
 Systematics of manipulation strategies was inferred from 
the number and ratio of chosen interventions. Low mean 
intervention frequencies were labeled systematic. An index 
of balanced vs. imbalanced intervention approaches was cal-
culated as follows: number of interventions corresponding to 
goal A minus number of interventions corresponding to goal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (2). User interface of the “Hanssen Shipping Company” CDC task. The two goals (a) contentment of passengers (left) and (b) produc-
tivity of employees (right) are shown together with the lists of possible measurements. 
Goal Conflicts in Complex Problem Solving The Open Psychology Journal, 2010, Volume 3    47 
B for intervention step t. The mean absolute value of these 
differences averaged above ten steps yielded the balance 
index. Low scores indicate a balance-focused strategy.  
 As a test of acquired system-related knowledge subjects 
completed an assessment questionnaire about the interven-
tion list. They rated each intervention according to how it 
affects both the first and the second goal. Ratings employ  
a 5-point scale from supposed advantageous effects to  
supposed disadvantageous effects. An index of acquisition  
of system-related knowledge was calculated by comparing 
subjects’ responses to the preset impact categories and  
by accounting for antagonistic or synergistic goal relations. 
Perfect ratings were scored 1, ratings from suboptimal, but 
adjacent categories were scored zero, ratings differing two  
or more categories from the preset value were punished by 
minus one score.  
 For purposes of experimental control and additional test-
ing we recorded subjects’ age, sex, profession or field of 
study. As an approximate indicator of cognitive ability final 
school exam grades (overall grade and math grade in particu-
lar) were surveyed. Motivational personality habits of action 
orientation or state orientation were raised by means of 
Kuhl’s questionnaire on action-control HAKEMP [28]. 
Analyses concerning these variables yet yielded no signifi-
cant effects and will not be reported for the sake of brevity. 
Results 
 Motivation and Stress. After factor analytical exploration 
of self-report data (PCA, varimax rotation), from QCM items 
two 9-item-subscales were generated that corresponded to 
the combined QCM subscales “anxiety – probability of suc-
cess” (AP) and “interest – challenge” (IC) from the original 
QCM [25]. Concerning pre-experimental motivation, par-
ticipants of the three experimental conditions showed com-
parable levels of AP and IC, AP: F(2, 68) < 1, ns, IC: F(2, 
68) < 1, ns. For AP measured after Phase 1 and 2, there was 
a significant main effect for goal relation, F(2, 66) = 6.56, p 
< .01, f = 0.45, indicating lower expectancy of success for 
participants of the antagonistic goal condition as compared 
to the two control groups (p < .01). However, no such effect 
occurred for IC, F(2, 66) < 1, ns.  
 The stress scale was reduced to a 10-item one-
dimensional scale with Cronbach’s alpha internal consisten-
cies between alpha = .83 (pre-experimental) and alpha = .86 
(after Phase 1). As with motivation, no significant effects 
prior to simulation experience were found, F(2, 67) < 1, ns. 
In Phase 1 and 2, however, a significant main effect oc-
curred, F(2, 65) = 4.84, p < .05, f = 0.39. Post hoc contrasts 
revealed that perceived stress was significantly higher in the 
antagonistic goal condition (p < .01). 
 Overall, participants rated their probability of success 
relatively high. Mean ratings ranged from M = 5.52 (SD = 
.13; pre-experimental) to M = 5.73 (SD = .11; Phase 2) on a 
7-point scale with an upward tendency over time, Pillai’s 
Trace: F(2, 65) = 5.70, p < .01, f = 0.42. Stress levels in the 
experimental testing situation were constantly low over ex-
perimental conditions, with mean scores between M = 2.39 
(SD = .81; Phase 2) and M = 2.55 (SD = .86; pre-
experimental) on a 7-point scale, Pillai’s Trace: F(2, 64) = 
1.32, p = .28.  
 Cognitive style. Self-reports from the questionnaire of 
cognitive approaches in problem solving were analyzed ac-
cording to two sub-dimensions gained from factor analysis 
(PCA, varimax rotation): systematic vs. heuristic style (6 
items) and dependent-hesitant vs. assertive style (4 items). 
Typical items to characterize the systematic style were “I 
reflected on each step carefully” (systematic style) or “Often 
I decided by intuition” (heuristic style). The dependent-
hesitant comprises items such as “Often I hesitated because I 
could not make a decision” (hesitant style) or “I would have 
liked to ask somebody for advice” (dependent style). The total 
variance explained by the two-factor solution was 46.83 % 
for Phase 1 and 58.70 % for Phase 2. For both subscales 
measures of internal consistency were satisfactory. Means of 
reported systematic styles did not vary significantly among 
groups, F(2, 66) < 1, ns. However, for the dependency scale 
effects of goal relation became highly significant, F(2, 66) = 
7.49, p < .01, f = 0.48. This was due to higher ratings among 
participants of the goal conflict condition (p < .01). Reported 
dependency and hesitation within all groups markedly de-
clined over time, i.e., problem-solvers became more assertive 
with growing experience, F(1, 66) = 10.90, p < .01, f = 0.41.  
 As behavioral measurements of hesitation we investi-
gated mean solution times. These, too, showed a decline over 
time, reflecting effects of experience and habituation, F(1, 
66) = 111.91, p < .01, f = 1.30. Yet we did not detect any 
differences attributable to goal condition, F(66, 2) = 1.01, p 
= .37. On a descriptive level, subjects dealing with the syn-
ergistic scenario spend the least time on the problem (M = 
29.27, SD = 2.80) while on average subjects of the antago-
nistic (M = 34.11, SD = 2.80) and the independent goal 
group (M = 34.17, SD = 2.80) required virtually the same 
length of time. 
 Not quite consistently, there were positive relations be-
tween solution time and self-reported dependency. The 
higher perceived hesitation, the longer the time spent on the 
corresponding round of problem solving. Correlations were 
of moderate, but robust size, with coefficients of r = .46 for 
Phase 1 und r = .34 for Phase 2.  
 Problem-solving strategies. According to our hypothesis, 
for the antagonistic goal relation scenario, overall, we had 
assumed a reduction of selected interventions. This general 
prediction was not confirmed (Phase 1: "(2) = 2.35, p = .31, 
Phase 2: "(2) = 1.08, p = .58). In fact, subjects of the antago-
nistic goal condition performed more interventions in Phase 
1, but fewer interventions in Phase 2 than did control sub-
jects (see Fig. 3). Control participants, on average, kept a 
constant level of system manipulations. This observation was 
tested statistically by comparing the pairwise differences of 
intervention scores from Phase 1 minus Phase 2. A highly 
significant Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that the differences 
were considerably higher under goal antagonism ("(2) = 
17.66, p < .01). Hence, an interaction between time as a 
within-subject-factor and goal relation as a between-subject 
factor was identified.  
 The pattern of starting with strong manipulation in Phase 
1 and weak manipulation in Phase 2 was observed not only 
with regard to between-subject effects, but also in an ex-
ploratory within-subject analysis. We divided subjects in two 
categories: those whose mean intervention score decreased 
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from round 1 to round 2 and those whose mean intervention 
score either increased or remained equal. Nearly all of the 
antagonistic goal participants were found to belong to the 
first category. In contrast, among independent and synergis-
tic goal participants classification ratios appeared to be  
balanced, "(2) = 15.56, p < .01. 
 With respect to the second indicator of problem-solving 
strategies, intervention balance, our hypothesis predicted a 
more balanced manipulation behavior in case of antagonistic 
goals. We assumed that problem-solvers would equally mind 
the two goals and undertake about equal numbers of inter-
vention on each side. However, results showed the reverse: 
Imbalance was significantly higher in the group of antago-
nistic scenario treatment (p < .05, f = 0.38). Closer analysis 
revealed that effects of raised imbalance only occurred in 
Phase 1, F(2, 66) = 7.47, p < .01, f = 0.48, but not in Phase 2, 
F(2, 66) < 1, ns. Hence, subjects confronted with antagonism 
started by using a rather imbalanced approach and tended to 
keep more balance later. Control participants on the contrary 
began their exploration balanced and prioritized goal han-
dling later.  
 Taken the results together, no increased systematics  
according to the conventional view appeared. Yet the two 
indicators of strategy employment convey an adaptive  
pattern of self-regulatory processes in dealing with conflict  
problems. “Overreaction”, i.e., overregulation and intensified 
measures may be the initial response to cope with a difficult 
and frustrating antagonistic problem. In our first experiment 
reduced intervention was identified as late as in Phase 2, i.e., 
after some experience and possibly after a change in strategic 
approach.  
 Acquisition of system-related knowledge. Fig. (4) displays 
the indices of mean knowledge acquisition over Phase 1 and 
2 related to experimental conditions. A highly significant 
main effect for goal relation appeared, F(2, 66) = 16.34,  
p < .01, f = 0.70. This was assignable to the immense amount 
of knowledge gained under independent goal conditions  
(p < .01). Comparing the two scenarios of equal connected-
ness, i.e., the antagonistic goal condition versus the synergis-
tic condition, contrary to our expectation there were no 
meaningful differences (p > .50). The within subject-factor 
time proved significant and thus hinted at effects of learning 
and experience on understanding the unknown effects of 
interventions on goal states, F(1, 66) = 5.77, p < .05.  
Discussion 
 Based on a cognitive-motivational framework we stated a 
number of characteristic effects occurring when complex 
problem-solving situations involve conflicting goals. Firstly, 
we argued that problem solvers’ current motivation would 
suffer from conflict experience as well as perceived stress 
levels would increase. The results support these assumptions 
although, considered from an absolute level, subjects still 
seemed confident and relaxed in spite of the preset goal con-
flicts. The finding is much in line with the well-documented 
everyday phenomenon that failing to reach goals or perceiv-
ing stagnation in planned transactions leads to frustration and 
stress [17, 29].  
 Yet the more difficult, potentially frustrating tasks are not 
necessarily the more boring ones according to participants’ 
ratings. No systematic interrelation between goal type and 
the combined scale of interest and challenge was found. 
General and more obvious features of appearance and usabil-
ity might have influenced interest in the computer system 
than did the structural differences between experimental 
conditions. Furthermore, personality factors may have a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (3). Mean intervention frequencies as indicators of strategic approaches in problem solving in Experiment 1 (N = 69). The maximum 
number of selectable interventions was 18. 
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great impact on this matter. From the perspective of person-
ality, interest should depend on both a problem-solver’s abil-
ity as well as on habitual preferences for difficult or simple 
ventures as related to achievement motivation [30]. In this 
case, however, indirect indicators of ability (school grades) 
turned out to be non-predictive. 
 Another expected characteristic of problem solving under 
antagonistic goal conditions was a passive, state-orientation 
like approach in handling the simulation scenario. This hy-
pothesis turned out to fit with self-report data of hesitation 
and perceived feelings of dependency, but not with the ob-
jective amount of time spent on the task. As both indicators 
correlate positively, to some extent solution times tend  
to be affected by goal conflicts, too. But we presume  
that measurable solution time is no perfect mapping of  
hesitation and insecurity. During problem-solving subjects 
may slow down for a variety of reasons both related and  
unrelated to the problem at hand. For those who feel unasser-
tive how to cope with the problem rumination and extended 
reflection time is simply one possible strategy among others. 
An alternative, e.g., would be to rush through the task, real-
izing that most effort in the conflict scenario will remain 
without substantial effect anyway. Thus, by analyzing mere 
solution times no insight is provided in whether problem-
solving actions are constructive, reflective, and efficient or 
panic-like, non-reflective, and inefficient. 
 Cognitive indicators of problem solving in a narrower 
sense were observable strategies and knowledge acquisition. 
Results concerning the number and balance of selected inter-
ventions promote the idea that preset goal conflicts induce 
different types of strategies than do problems of multiple, 
independent goals. Against expectations, however, strategies 
appeared to be instable and showed dynamic variations over 
time. As a general trend averaged over participants and in-
tervention episodes we observed a pattern of initial “action-
ism” and later intervention reduction. Paralleling this effect, 
subjects dealing with goal antagonism started with rather 
imbalanced manipulation patterns, i.e., they tended to pro-
mote the more deficient goal module and to ignore the other 
– until in the following step the formerly ignored module 
was deficient and had to be pushed. As the number of ma-
nipulations decreased over time, on the whole problem-
solving strategies became more balanced and represent si-
multaneous pursuit of the two demanded goals. These spe-
cific changes did not appear when goals were independent or 
synergetically related.  
 Considering knowledge acquisition, successfully grasp-
ing the problem structure turned out to be a matter of the 
system’s formal complexity or connectivity [11, 31, 32]. 
Subjects analyzed the system best and found out most cor-
rect information if parallel goals were unrelated. Obviously, 
testing the effects of single interventions is much easier if 
nine intervention measures contribute to influence a goal 
score than if the goal score is influenced by nine plus nine 
intervention measures. The hypothesis according to which 
goal antagonism drives problem-solvers to systematic, effi-
cient acquisition of structural knowledge must be deferred 
because in spite of equal degrees of formal complexity, an-
tagonistic goal subjects did not understand the system any 
better than their peers from the second control group, the 
synergistic goal condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (4). Reproduction of participants’ acquired system!related knowledge in Experiment 1 (N = 69). 
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 To summarize, in Experiment 1 induced goal conflicts 
had temporary, but verifiable effects on motivational and 
cognitive facets in the process of complex problem solving. 
Namely, conflict experience impaired expectations of suc-
cess, enhanced insecurity and stress. Problem-solving strate-
gies can be characterized as a crossover from enhanced ac-
tion to low, but possibly more thoughtful action. Knowledge 
acquisition does not benefit from antagonistic structures in a 
complex scenario. Instead, it is important to stress that goal 
conflicts are generally associated with intransparency and 
complexity, which complicates the process of gaining 
knowledge.  
 Experiment 2 was conducted to test whether the main 
findings could be generalized in a multiple goal setting in-
volving more than two goals. The aim was to replicate moti-
vational effects of goal antagonism and to justify post hoc 
explanations concerning self-regulative strategies on an in-
dependent data basis. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
 Participants. We tested 42 subjects (15 male, 27 female) 
who had not taken part in the first study and hence had no 
prior experience with the shipping scenario. In the sample, 
students of different fields of study were included (psychol-
ogy, natural sciences, humanities, law, economics, and social 
sciences). 17 students (40%) were enrolled in psychology. 
The mean age was 25.46 (SD = .73) with a range from 17 to 
40. Participants were free to choose between course credit 
and a payment of 5!. Gender ratios were equal for the two 
experimental conditions. 
 Design. Only two levels of goal relation were tested in a 
between-subject design: goal antagonism vs. goal indepen-
dence. Measures from two identical rounds of problem  
solving led to time as a within-subject factor in a 2 ! 2 
ANOVA design.  
 Procedure. The course of experimental procedure was 
virtually the same as in Experiment 1: introductory phase, 
two rounds of scenario treatment followed by final record-
ings and debriefing. 
 Materials and measures. The main novelty of Experi-
ment 2 concerned the construction of the CDC task. Antago-
nistic goal relations were established between the four,  
pre-tested goal demands. Antagonism followed a circular 
structure, i.e., in the conflict condition intervention scores  
of the goal contentment of passengers were subtracted from 
the quality of management scores, quality of management 
negatively affected the public reputation of the ship owner, 
ship owner’s reputation negatively affected the productivity 
of employees and this, in turn, exerted antagonism on the 
contentment of passengers. In the extended version of 
“Hanssen Shipping Company” the four goal states and  
related measure lists were presented simultaneously on a 
single screen. As in Experiment 1, each round comprised ten 
intervention steps.  
 Measures of current motivation, experienced stress symp-
toms, cognitive solution approaches, and acquired system-
related knowledge were adopted from Experiment 1. Regard-
ing intervention balance, instead of the difference algorithm, 
we computed the variation of intervention frequencies per 
goal over the four goals of the same intervention step. These 
were averaged above the ten steps per round. High average 
variation scores are interpretable in terms of an imbalanced 
procedure whereas low variation reflects more balanced ap-
proaches.  
Results 
 Motivation and stress. The two-factor FAM measures AP 
and IC as well as the 10-item perceived stress scale from 
Experiment 1 were confirmed and adopted. Pre-experimental 
differences were found neither for the AP and IC motiva-
tional subscales nor for the stress scale, AP: t(40) = .07, ns, 
IC: t(40) = 1.33, p = .20, stress: t(40) = 1.70, p = .10. Con-
trary to our expectations and first findings, repeated meas-
ures over Phase 1 and 2 yielded no significant effects of mo-
tivation although AP and IC tended to be lower in the an-
tagonistic goal condition, AP: F(1, 40) = 2.81, p = .10, IC: 
F(1, 40) = 1.75, p = .19. Comparisons of stress means over 
Phase 1 and 2 reached marginal significance in the predicted 
direction, F(1, 40) = 3.99, p = .05. The effect was more 
prominent for Phase 1, i.e., after subjects’ initial confronta-
tion with the conflict scenario, than after Phase 2.  
 In line with the previous results, mean ratings of AP 
above three measuring times ranged from M = 5.62 (SD = 
.18) to M = 5.68 (SD = .16). Stress ratings ranged from M = 
2.75 (SD = .19) to M = 2.93 (SD = .21). In brief, participants 
were relatively confident and relaxed in mastering the simu-
lation problem with a tendency of impairment when goal 
conflicts existed.  
 Cognitive style. The two studied self-report dimensions, 
systematicity and dependency – hesitation, were the same as 
in the first experiment. As only dependency proved suffi-
ciently stable in the check of internal consistency, the sys-
tematicity scale was omitted. For self-reported dependency, a 
significant main effect of goal relation was found, F(1, 40) = 
6.43, p < .05, f = 0.40. As predicted, subjects of the antago-
nistic goal condition rated perceived hesitation higher. Once 
again, no corresponding effect of solution time occurred, 
F(1, 40) < 1, ns. Hesitation tended to decrease over time al-
though not significantly, F(1, 40) = 2.37, p = .13. Concern-
ing solution times the effect of customization was highly 
prominent, F(1, 40) = 121.09, p < .01, f = 1.74.  
 Problem-solving strategies. In line with our original hy-
pothesis, but partly differing from the first study, in Experi-
ment 2 we identified significantly lower intervention fre-
quencies in the antagonistic goal condition than in the inde-
pendent goal condition. The findings refer to both Phase 1 
and Phase 2 (Phase 1: U = 110.00, p < .01, Phase 2: U = 
85.00, p < .01). Subjects dealing with the antagonistic prob-
lem started on a low intervention level and reduced manipu-
lation frequencies even further. Subjects of the independent 
goal condition showed but a slight decline in manipulation 
frequencies on a higher starting level (see Fig. 5). Corrobo-
rating prior interaction results, the decline over time was 
significantly more pronounced when goals interfered than 
when they were independent (U = 136.50, p < .05).  
 The index of imbalanced problem-solving behavior did 
not turn out to differ significantly between the two experi-
mental conditions (Phase 1: U = 165.00, p = .34, Phase 2:  
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U = 167.00, p = .37). As found in Experiment 1, the differ-
ence between the Phase 1 variation score and the Phase 2 
variation score was higher for antagonistic goal condition 
subjects, i.e., only these participants inclined towards a more 
balanced approach. Yet statistics did not firm up descriptive 
observations (U = 184.00, p > .50). 
 Acquisition of system-related knowledge. Subjects of the 
more complex experimental conflict condition performed 
worse on the knowledge test than did their peers of the inde-
pendent goal condition, F(1, 40) = 18.67, p < .01, f = 0.68.  
Combining and Comparing the Results from Experiment 
1 and Experiment 2 
 An additional issue approached the question of how the 
number of preset goals in a complex problem-solving para-
digm affects motivation and cognition. Analyses are based 
on a merged sample of subjects from Experiment 1 and 2. 
Only participants of the antagonistic and the independent 
goal condition were included, leading to a total sample size 
of N = 88. The three two-level factors goal number (two vs. 
four), goal relation (antagonistic vs. independent) and time 
make up a nearly balanced, quasi-experimental 2 ! 2 ! 2 
ANOVA design with cell sizes of either N = 21 or N = 23 
and repeated measures. 
 Dependent variables to be examined were the following: 
the motivational scales anxiety – probability of success and 
interest – challenge, stress, solution time and reported de-
pendency. For none of these variables interactions between 
goal number and goal relation were found. Main effects of 
goal relation conform to those from single-experiment analy-
ses. The factor goal number reached significance for the IC 
scale, F(1, 84) = 7.89, p < .01, f = 0.31, and for solution 
time, F(1, 84) = 65.98, p < .01, f = 0.89. Subjects working on 
the extended four-goal scenario rated the task more interest-
ing and spent almost twice as much time on it. On average, 
participants in Experiment 1 took M = 34.14 s (SD = 2.39) 
per intervention step, whereas participants in Experiment 2 
took M = 62.25 s (SD = 2.50). No differences occurred with 
regard to self-assessments of probability of success, F(1, 84) 
< 1, ns, stress symptoms, F(1, 84) < 1, ns, and hesitation, 
F(1, 84) < 1, ns.  
Discussion  
 Experiment 2 reinvestigated the cognitive-motivational 
model of goal antagonism in complex problem-solving in the 
context of four instead of two conflicting goals. Impairing 
effects of goal interference on motivation and wellbeing 
were not as distinct and robust as in the first study. They 
tended to last but for the first of two rounds in working on 
the computer simulation. Possibly, as the four-goal scenario 
contained twice as many intervention measures than the two-
goal scenario, this task was rather complicated even in case 
of goal independence, and discriminatory power due to the 
goal relation factor was reduced. Some participants under the 
goal conflict condition noted they knew declining goal 
scores were “not their own fault” and remained unimpressed 
by the computer’s negative feedback on control perform-
ance. A closer look at processes of attribution might be help-
ful for future investigations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. (5). Mean intervention frequencies as indicators of strategic approaches in problem solving in Experiment 2 (N = 42). The maximum 
number of selectable interventions was 36. 
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 Concerning strategy employment the results convey a 
partly ambivalent picture. Based on the enlarged four-goal-
scenario they confirm our new, adopted assumption that con-
flict experience is followed by reduced intervention engage-
ment. Yet initial overregulation, i.e., enhanced manipulation 
of the system was not observed. One explanation might be 
that with the extended list of intervention measures, in either 
treatment condition it was evident right from the beginning 
that ten intervention steps would be insufficient to test each 
single measure step by step. So both antagonistic and inde-
pendent goal problem-solvers might have started with a 
rather broad, heuristic selection of possibly efficient manipu-
lations.  
 The relation between goal interdependency and gained 
structural knowledge about the system was clearly as pre-
dicted: The independent goal scenario seems to facilitate 
analytical reasoning about interventions’ effectiveness. Sub-
jects gave more correct ratings of interventions’ effective-
ness. The hypothesis that formal complexity due to intrans-
parency and connectivity is a major determinant on perform-
ance in complex problem solving finds further empirical 
support. 
 Comparative analyses of Experiment 1 and 2 show that 
when confronted with four instead of two goal demands 
problem-solvers’ motivation, wellbeing, and cognitive-
behavioral performance is not affected in a negative way. On 
the contrary, interest is raised. Problem-solvers seemed to 
find it challenging handling four goals simultaneously, and 
they accepted the challenge as their long solution times sug-
gest. Generally speaking of a manageable number of parallel 
goals, a major motivational loss does not result from a strug-
gle for limited cognitive resources, but from difficulties in 
arranging goals with mutually exclusive consequences. As 
long as four goals in a computer simulation are concerned, 
limitations of cognitive capacity cannot offer sufficient ex-
planation for the reported findings. To investigate how many 
parallel goals will entail capacity overload and concomitant 
factors, however, can broaden the perspective of research on 
goal conflicts in the future. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The aim of the reported study was to examine motiva-
tional and cognitive effects of conflicting goals or strivings. 
Goal conflicts are well known, universalized phenomena 
experienced in both group interactions and intra-individual 
struggling. Our work focused on the intra-individual per-
spective with particular regard to new, non-routine situations 
in which an existing incongruity between goals must be de-
tected and managed. Although empirical research has relia-
bly shown motivational impairment of long-term conflict 
experience (e.g., [9]) the specific approach to problem solv-
ing is a new one. Thus far, in the domain of complex-
problem solving systematic investigations on polytely have 
been scarce. As a tool of experimental manipulation and con-
trol of goal conflicts we applied a complex dynamic control 
task, an engaging, game-like computer simulation in which 
approaching one goal could be performed but at the expense 
of falling short of another goal. 
 The results of two studies (N = 111) support the notion 
that even in a standardized laboratory setting goal conflicts 
can be induced. These conflicts lessen motivation during the 
process of complex problem solving. Reduced confidence in 
success, impaired wellbeing and increased hesitation are 
measurable consequences. The findings fit well with the first 
three out of the five hypotheses we propose in our above 
framework.  
 Yet from our experiments there is no evidence that con-
flict-induced motivational losses strongly affect cognitive 
problem-solving performance in a linear predictable manner. 
On a descriptive level we can infer that people becoming 
gradually aware of a goal conflict react to this awareness in 
some way. They reveal changed patterns of exploration 
strategies. Namely, as a generalized trend they will increase 
action initially. With growing experience manipulations will 
decrease. Paralleling this effect, problem-solvers will be in-
clined to try a balanced pursuit of the incompatible goals. In 
the present studies manipulation patterns were only observed 
on the base of aggregated data, i.e., effects averaged over 
experimental treatment conditions and time steps. Extended 
individual process analyses including think aloud protocols 
and time-series designs might yield more precise patterns. 
These in turn would help to refine the strategy hypothesis in 
our framework as well as the hypothesis of knowledge ac-
quisition.  
 Our experimental work did not confirm the idea that de-
motivated problem solvers who are struggling with induced 
goal conflicts can analyze and reproduce formal relationships 
within the structure of a complex scenario any better or 
worse than do relaxed, motivated participants of a control 
condition as long as the degree of formal complexity is iden-
tical. To reinvestigate this fifth hypothesis of the framework 
it might be necessary to extend subjects’ exploration oppor-
tunities. In order to systematically test for effects of single 
manipulations the number of exploration trials should be 
increased possibly in combination with less intervention 
measures to be selected. 
 Hence, overall there is empirical evidence supporting the 
framework, but connections between motivational and cog-
nitive effects of goal conflicts will need further inspection. 
Although the high impact of motivation and cognition or 
learning has frequently been stressed in research [21, 33] two 
general concerns can make it difficult to establish strong 
relations in an experimental paradigm. Firstly, conflict expe-
rience does not refer to personal, intrinsic goals. Brunstein 
and Maier [6] argue that prescribed “told-to-do” goals, too, 
are prone to arouse conflict, still an experimental induction 
cannot claim that goal conflicts are deeply grounded in prob-
lem-solvers hearts and minds. Secondly, in some cases, 
simulated conflicts might simply appear interesting and ap-
pealing to problem solvers, but not threatening, similar to 
entertaining polytelic computer games. Our approach was 
clearly an experimental one, emphasizing differences be-
tween treatment groups instead of personality effects. By 
realizing equal gender ratios among goal relation conditions, 
the predominance of female participants in our sample still 
allowed for internal validity. Gender-related styles in goal 
management, however, might be an issue to be studied in 
larger samples with equal gender distributions.  
 In developing the framework of multiple goal effects 
further we also suggest to take into account the number of 
conflicting goals. Our exploratory investigation reveals that 
conflicts between two goals are no less demotivating than 
Goal Conflicts in Complex Problem Solving The Open Psychology Journal, 2010, Volume 3    53 
conflicts among four goals. More systematic variation over 
an extended range of goal numbers would help to elucidate 
to what extent limitations of cognitive processing capacity 
play a role in dealing with multiple and conflicting goals. 
The more goals to manage the more crucial interference due 
to overstress will presumably become. Individual strategies 
such as prioritizing goals and dismissing others may unfold 
influence when more than two goals are presented.  
 Another future concern refers to multiple goals arising 
from the demands of multiple lobbies (e.g., economy vs. 
ecology in a political setting). As mentioned in our introduc-
tory example of an ambivalent manager, intrapersonal goal 
conflicts only focus a narrow aspect of multiple strivings. A 
broader perspective should deal with interpersonal goal con-
flicts and the question whether and how the communication 
of multiple demands between people relates to goal conflicts 
in a single person’s mind. Selecting problem-solving partici-
pants on the base of different preferences (e.g., determined 
economists vs. resolute ecologists) might convey induced 
goal conflicts into real life goal conflicts. Nevertheless, the 
CDC conflict paradigm might provide a tool to analyze such 
even more complex interactions in goal pursuit for standard-
ized, non-routine situations, if presented as a team task in an 
interactive computer simulation.  
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